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Multinationals and futures hedging under
liquidity constraints
Abstract
This paper examines the behavior of a multinational firm (MNF) under exchange rate uncer-
tainty. The MNF has operations domiciled in the home country and in a foreign country. Each of
these two operations produces a single homogeneous good to be sold in the home and foreign mar-
kets. To hedge the exchange rate risk, the MNF has access to an intertemporally unbiased currency
futures market. All currency futures contracts are marked-to-market and thus require interim cash
settlement of gains and losses. We impose a liquidity constraint on the MNF in that the MNF is
forced to prematurely liquidate its futures position from which the interim loss exceeds a predeter-
mined threshold level. If the MNF’s utility function satisfies decreasing absolute risk aversion, we
show that the MNF optimally opts for a short under-hedge. Furthermore, the MNF sells less (more)
and produces more (less) in the foreign (home) country in response to the imposition of the liquidity
constraint.
JEL classification: D81; F23; F31
Keywords: Futures; Marking to market; Multinationals; Liquidity constraints
1. Introduction
According to the Committee on Payments and Settlement Systems (1998), firms should
take liquidity risk seriously when devising their risk management strategies. Jorion (2001)
categorizes liquidity risk into asset liquidity risk and funding liquidity risk. The former refers
to the risk that the liquidation value of the assets differs significantly from the prevailing
mark-to-market value. The latter refers to the risk that payment obligations cannot be met
due to inability to raise new funds. Even for firms that are technically solvent, liquidity
risk can be fatal to them. Prominent examples include the case of Metallgesellschaft and
the debacle of Long-Term Capital Management.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of liquidity risk on the behavior of a
multinational firm (MNF) facing exchange rate uncertainty. To this end, we develop a two-
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period model of a risk-averse MNF that has operations domiciled in the home country and
in a foreign country. Each of these two operations produces a single homogeneous good to
be sold in the home and foreign markets. To hedge its exchange rate risk exposure, the MNF
has access to an intertemporally unbiased currency futures market. All currency futures
contracts are marked-to-market in that they require interim cash settlement of gains and
losses. These ex-post funding needs due to the marking-to-market process create liquidity
risk vis-a`-vis the exchange rate risk. Following Lien (2003) and Wong (2004a, 2004b), we
impose a liquidity constraint on the MNF. Specifically, the MNF is forced to prematurely
liquidate its futures position whenever the interim loss incurred from this position exceeds
a predetermined threshold level.
In the presence of the liquidity constraint, we show that the MNF optimally opts for
a short under-hedge if the MNF’s preferences satisfy the reasonable behavioral property of
decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA). Under-hedging is called for to strike a balance
between the extent of the exchange rate risk and that of the liquidity risk. This is consis-
tent with the normal practice of partial hedging that most companies do not use financial
derivatives to completely hedge their risk exposures (see Tufano, 1996; Bodnar, Hayt, &
Marston, 1998).
Owing to the presence of the liquidity constraint, sales in the foreign market are embed-
ded with some residual exchange rate risk that cannot be eliminated. A risk premium is
thus demanded by the MNF on its foreign sales. This creates a wedge between the marginal
revenues in the home and foreign markets. As a result, the MNF with the DARA utility
function sells less (more) and produces more (less) in the foreign (home) country in response
to the imposition of the liquidity constraint. These adjustments in sales and outputs result
in a lower expected global domestic profit accrued to and a lower expected utility level
attainable by the MNF as compared to those in the absence of the liquidity constraint.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 delineates a two-period model
of a risk-averse MNF facing both exchange rate risk and liquidity risk. Section 3 derives the
MNF’s optimal hedging decision. Section 4 examines the impact of the liquidity constraint
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on the MNF’s production and sales decisions. The final section concludes.
2. The model
Consider a two-period, three-date (indexed by t = 0, 1, and 2) model of a multinational
firm (MNF) that has operations domiciled in the home country and in a foreign country.
Interest rates in both periods are known with certainty. We as such compound all cash
flows to their future values at t = 2 throughout the paper.
The MNF’s home operation produces a single homogeneous good, xH , according to a
cost function, CH(xH), denominated in the domestic currency. The MNF’s foreign oper-
ation produces the same homogeneous good, xF , according to a cost function, CF (xF ),
denominated in the foreign currency.1 The two cost functions, CH(xH) and CF (xF ), are
assumed to be strictly increasing and convex.
At t = 2, the MNF sells yH units of its total output, xH + xF , in the home country and
yF units in the foreign country, where yH + yF = xH + xF . The sales in the home market
generate a revenue function, RH(yH), denominated in the domestic currency, whereas the
sales in the foreign market generate a revenue function, RF (yF ), denominated in the foreign
currency. Both RH(yH) and RF (yF ) are assumed to be strictly increasing and concave,
indicating some monopoly power enjoyed by the MNF in the home and foreign markets.
The prevailing spot exchange rate at t = 2 of the domestic currency against the foreign
currency, e˜2, is not known ex ante.2 To hedge its exposure to this exchange rate risk, the
MNF can trade infinitely divisible contracts in a currency futures market at t = 0. Each
of the currency futures contracts calls for delivery of f0 units of the domestic currency per
unit of the foreign currency at t = 2. Let z be the number of the currency futures contracts
sold (purchased if negative) by the MNF at t = 0.
1The assumption that the MNF’s home and foreign operations produce the same homogeneous good is
not crucial. In the case of differentiated goods, we wold have two-way trade between the home and foreign
operations rather than one-way trade as in the model.
2Throughout the paper, random variables have a tilde (∼) while their realizations do not.
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While the initial futures exchange rate, f0, is known, the futures exchange rate at
t = 1, f˜1, is regarded as a positive random variable. Let φ(f1) and Φ(f1) be the known
probability density function and cumulative distribution function of f˜1, respectively, over
support [f
1
, f1], where 0 < f1 < f1 <∞. Conditioned on the realized futures exchange rate
at t = 1, f˜1 = f1, the spot exchange rate at t = 2, which by convergence is also the futures
exchange rate at t = 2, can be specified as e˜2 = f1+ε˜, where ε˜ is a random variable. To focus
on the MNF’s hedging motive, vis-a`-vis its speculative motive, we assume that the currency
futures market is intertemporally unbiased. That is, we set f0 equal to the unconditional
expected value of e˜2 and ˜ equal to a zero-mean random variable conditionally independent
of f˜1, thereby rendering f1 equal to the conditional expected value of e˜2. Let ψ(ε) and
Ψ(ε) be the known probability density function and cumulative distribution function of ε˜,
respectively, over support [ε, ε], where −f
1
< ε < 0 < ε <∞.
All of the currency futures contracts are marked to market at the end of each period.
Thus, conditioned on the realized futures exchange rate at t = 1, f˜1 = f1, the MNF enjoys
a gain (or suffer a loss if negative) from its futures position, z, equal to (f0 − f1)z at t = 1.
Following Lien (2003) and Wong (2004a, 2004b), we impose a liquidity constraint on the
MNF. Specifically, the MNF is forced to prematurely liquidate its futures position at t = 1
whenever the loss incurred at that time exceeds a predetermined threshold level, k, i.e.,
whenever (f1 − f0)z > k. Thus, if (f1 − f0)z > k, the MNF prematurely liquidates its
futures position at t = 1, implying that its random global profit at t = 2, denominated in
the domestic currency, is given by
Π˜L = RH(yH)− CH(xH) + (f1 + ε˜)[RF (yF )− CF (xF )] + (f0 − f1)z. (1)
On the other hand, if (f1− f0)z ≤ k, the MNF holds its futures position until t = 2 so that
its random global domestic currency profit at t = 2 becomes
Π˜C = RH(yH)− CH(xH) + (f1 + ε˜)[RF (yF )− CF (xF )] + (f0 − f1 − ε˜)z. (2)
The MNF possesses a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, U(Π), defined over
its global domestic currency profit at t = 2, Π, with U ′(Π) > 0 and U ′′(Π) < 0, indicating
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the presence of risk aversion.3 Anticipating the liquidity constraint at t = 1, the MNF has
to choose the levels of output in the home and foreign operations, xH and xF , the sales
in the home and foreign markets, yH and yF , and the futures position, z, at t = 0 so as
to maximize the expected utility of its random global domestic currency profit at t = 2,
subject to the constraint that xH + xF = yH + yF .
In Appendix A, we show that it is optimal for the MNF to opt for a short futures
position, i.e., z > 0. Thus, the MNF’s ex-ante decision problem at t = 0 is given by
max
xH ,xF ,yH ,yF ,z
∫ f0+k/z
f
1
Eε[U(Π˜C)] dΦ(f1) +
∫ f1
f0+k/z
Eε[U(Π˜L)] dΦ(f1) (3)
subject to xH+xF = yH+yF , where Eε(·) is the expectation operator with respect to Ψ(ε),
and Π˜L and Π˜C are defined in equations (1) and (2), respectively.
3. Optimal hedging decision
Assuming an interior optimal solution and making use of the constraint that yF =
xH + xF − yH , the first-order conditions for program (3) with respect to xH , xF , yH , and
z are respectively given by4
∫ f0+k/z∗
f
1
Eε{U ′(Π˜∗C)[(f1 + ε˜)R′F (y∗F )− C ′H (x∗H)]} dΦ(f1)
+
∫ f1
f0+k/z∗
Eε{U ′(Π˜∗L)[(f1 + ε˜)R′F (y∗F )− C ′H(x∗H)]} dΦ(f1) = 0, (4)
∫ f0+k/z∗
f
1
Eε{U ′(Π˜∗C)(f1 + ε˜)[R′F (y∗F )− C ′F (x∗F )]} dΦ(f1)
3If the MNF is risk neutral, hedging with the intertemporally unbiased currency futures contracts adds
no value to the MNF. The assumption of risk aversion can be justified by the prevalence of corporate taxes,
costs of financial distress, or capital market imperfections (see Stulz, 1996).
4Sufficient conditions for an interior optimal solution are that R′H(0) = R
′
F (0) =∞, R′H(∞) = R′F (∞) =
0, C ′H(0) = C
′
F (0) = 0, and C
′
H(∞) = C ′F (∞) =∞.
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+
∫ f1
f0+k/z∗
Eε{U ′(Π˜∗L)(f1 + ε˜)[R′F (y∗F )− C ′F (x∗F )]} dΦ(f1) = 0, (5)
∫ f0+k/z∗
f
1
Eε{U ′(Π˜∗C)[R′H(y∗H)− (f1 + ε˜)R′F (y∗F )]} dΦ(f1)
+
∫ f1
f0+k/z∗
Eε{U ′(Π˜∗L)[R′H(y∗H)− (f1 + ε˜)R′F (y∗F )]} dΦ(f1) = 0, (6)
∫ f0+k/z∗
f
1
Eε[U ′(Π˜∗C)(f0 − f1 − ε˜)] dΦ(f1) +
∫ f1
f0+k/z∗
Eε[U ′(Π˜∗L)](f0 − f1) dΦ(f1)
+Eε[U(Π˜∗L0)− U(Π˜∗C0)] φ(f0 + k/z∗)k/z∗2 = 0, (7)
where we have used Leibniz’s rule,
Π˜∗L0 = RH(y
∗
H)− CH (x∗H) + (f0 + k/z∗ + ε˜)[RF (y∗F )− CF (y∗F )]− k, (8)
Π˜∗C0 = RH(y
∗
H)− CH(x∗H) + (f0 + k/z∗ + ε˜)[RF (y∗F )− CF (y∗F )]− k − ε˜z∗, (9)
and an asterisk (∗) indicates an optimal level.
As is well known in the literature, under multiple sources of risk, risk aversion alone is
usually too weak to yield intuitively appealing results and decreasing absolute risk aversion
(DARA) is called for (see Gollier, 2001). The MNF’s utility function, U(Π), exhibits DARA
if, and only if, the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion, −U ′′(Π)/U ′(Π), decreases
with Π.
Proposition 1: If the MNF’s utility function exhibits DARA and the currency futures
market is intertemporally unbiased, then the MNF facing the liquidity constraint optimally
opts for a short under-hedge futures position, i.e., 0 < z∗ < RF (y∗F )− CF (x∗F ).
Proof: See Appendix B. 2
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To see the intuition of Proposition 1, we refer to equations (1) and (2). If the MNF
faces no liquidity constraints, its random global domestic currency profit at t = 2 is de-
lineated solely by equation (2). In this case, the full-hedging theorem of Danthine (1976),
Holthausen (1979), Feder, Just, and Schmitz (1980), Broll and Zilcha (1992), and Broll,
Wong, and Zilcha (1999) applies in that setting z = RF (yF ) − CF (xF ) completely elimi-
nates the exchange rate risk. In the presence of the liquidity constraint, however, such a
full-hedge is no longer optimal due to the residual risk, ε˜[RF (yF )−CF (xF )], arising from the
premature liquidation of the futures position at t = 1, as evident from equation (1). This
creates an income effect because the presence of the liquidity risk reduces the attainable
expected utility under risk aversion. To attain the former expected utility level (with no
risk), the MNF has to be compensated with additional income. Taking away this compen-
sation gives rise to the income effect (see Wong, 1997). Under DARA, the MNF becomes
more risk averse and thus is unwilling to take on the liquidity risk. The MNF as such shorts
less of the currency futures contracts so as to shrink the interval, [f0 + k/z, f1], over which
the premature liquidation of the futures position at t = 1 prevails. It is therefore optimal
for the MNF to set z < RF (yF )− CF (xF ) that strikes a balance between the extent of the
exchange rate risk and that of the liquidity risk.
When k = ∞, the MNF’s liquidity constraint never binds and a full-hedge is optimal.
When k is finite, the liquidity constraint is in effect with positive probability and an under-
hedge becomes optimal according to Proposition 1. Thus, the severity of the liquidity
constraint, as gauged by the threshold, k, plays a pivotal role in shaping the MNF’s optimal
futures position, z∗.
Tufano (1996) documents that in the gold mining industry only 17% of firms shed 40%
or more of their price risk. Bodnar, Hayt, and Marston (1998) also find that most non-
financial firms do not use financial derivatives to completely hedge their risk exposures. Such
a normal practice of partial hedging may be due to the prevalence of liquidity constraints
confronted by firms, as suggested by Proposition 1.
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4. Optimal production and sales decisions
If the MNF faces no liquidity constraints, we know from Broll and Zilcha (1992) and
Broll, Wong, and Zilcha (1999) that the separation theorem of Danthine (1976), Holthausen
(1979), and Feder, Just, and Schmitz (1980) holds. Specifically, the optimal sales and
outputs in this case are given by5
R′H(y
0
H) = C
′
H(x
0
H), (10)
R′F (y
0
F ) = C
′
F (x
0
F ), (11)
R′H(y
0
H) = f0R
′
F (y
0
F ), (12)
where a nought (0) indicates an optimal level in the absence of the liquidity constraint.
Proposition 2: If the MNF’s utility function exhibits DARA and the currency futures
market is intertemporally unbiased, then imposing the liquidity constraint onto the MNF
induces a lower level of output in the home operation, x∗H < x
0
H , a higher level of output in
the foreign operation, x∗F > x
0
F , a higher level of sales in the home market, y
∗
H > y
0
H , and
a lower level of sales in the foreign market, y∗F < y
0
F .
Proof: See Appendix C. 2
To see the intuition of Proposition 2, we refer to equations (1) and (2). If the MNF
faces no liquidity constraints, its random global domestic currency profit at t = 2 is given by
equation (2) only. In this case, the MNF could have completely eliminated its exposure to
the exchange rate risk had it chosen z = RF (yF )−CF (yF ) within its own discretion. Alter-
natively put, the degree of exchange rate risk exposure to be assumed by the MNF should
be totally unrelated to its sales and production decisions. The optimal sales and outputs
are then chosen to maximize RH(yH)− CH(xH) + f0[RF (yF ) − CF (xF )], thereby yielding
5Equations (10), (11), and (12) follow immediately from equations (4), (5), (6), and (7) by setting k =∞.
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equations (10), (11), and (12). Equations (10) and (11) state that the MNF equates the
marginal revenues to the marginal costs in both the home and foreign markets, respectively.
Furthermore, equation (12) reveals that the marginal revenue in the home market is equal
to the expected marginal revenue in the foreign market, both of which are denominated
in the domestic currency. This is the celebrated separation theorem of Danthine (1978),
Holthausen (1979), and Feder, Just, and Schmitz (1980).
In the presence of the liquidity constraint, setting z = RF (yF )−CF (xF ) cannot eliminate
all the exchange rate risk due to the residual risk, ε˜[RF (yF ) − CF (xF )], arising from the
premature liquidation of the futures position at t = 1. Such residual risk, however, can be
controlled by varying the levels of output and sales. Equations (20) and (21) state that
it remains optimal for the MNF to equate the marginal revenues to the marginal costs in
both the home and foreign markets, respectively. However, equation (22) implies that the
marginal revenue in the home market is strictly less than the expected marginal revenue in
the foreign market, both of which are denominated in the domestic currency. Since the sales
in the foreign market are embedded with some exchange rate risk that cannot be eliminated
due to the liquidity constraint, the MNF has to demand a risk premium to compensate for
its foreign sales. The wedge between the two marginal revenues in the home and foreign
markets is de facto the risk premium required by the MNF. The MNF as such sells less
(more) and produces more (less) in the foreign (home) country. This is in line with the
findings of Broll and Zilcha (1992) and Broll, Wong, and Zilcha (1999).
In the absence of the liquidity constraint, the MNF optimally adopts a full-hedge that
eliminates all the exchange rate risk. The MNF then chooses its sales and outputs so as
to maximize its expected global domestic currency profit at t = 2. In the presence of the
liquidity constraint, the MNF adjusts its sales and outputs according to Proposition 2 by
selling less (more) and producing more (less) in the foreign (home) country. This must
imply the MNF’s expected global domestic currency profit at t = 2 be adversely affected
in face of the liquidity risk. Given risk aversion, the MNF’s expected utility must also
be lowered. Thus, the presence of the liquidity constraint unambiguously makes the MNF
strictly worse off regarding to both its profit and utility levels.
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5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined the behavior of a risk-averse multinational firm (MNF)
under exchange rate uncertainty. The MNF has operations domiciled in the home country
and in a foreign country. Each of these two operations produces a single homogeneous good
to be sold in the home and foreign markets. To hedge its exchange rate exposure, the MNF
has access to an intertemporally unbiased currency futures market. All currency futures
contracts are marked-to-market and thus require interim cash settlement of gains and losses.
These ex-post funding needs due to the marking-to-market process create liquidity risk vis-a`-
vis the exchange rate risk. As in Lien (2003) and Wong (2004a, 2004b), the MNF is liquidity
constrained in that it is forced to prematurely liquidate its futures position whenever the
interim loss incurred from this position exceeds a predetermined threshold level.
Within our context, we have shown that the MNF optimally opts for a short under-
hedge should the MNF’s preferences satisfy decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA). We
have further shown that the MNF with the DARA utility function sells less (more) and
produces more (less) in the foreign (home) country in response to the imposition of the
liquidity constraint. The liquidity risk created by the interim funding requirement of a
futures hedge thus bestows perverse incentives on the MNF regarding to its hedging and
production decisions. These result in a lower expected global domestic profit accrued to and
a lower expected utility level attainable by the MNF as compared to those in the absence
of the liquidity constraint, thereby making the MNF strictly worse off.
Multinationals and futures hedging 11
Appendix A
The expected utility of the MNF’s random domestic currency profit at t = 2 is given by
EU =

∫ f0+k/z
f
1
Eε[U(Π˜C)] dΦ(f1) +
∫ f1
f0+k/z
Eε[U(Π˜L)] dΦ(f1) if z > 0,
∫ f1
f
1
Eε[U(Π˜0)] dΦ(f1) if z = 0,
∫ f0+k/z
f
1
Eε[U(Π˜L)] dΦ(f1) +
∫ f1
f0+k/z
Eε[U(Π˜C)] dΦ(f1) if z < 0,
(13)
where Π˜0 = RH(yH)−CH(xH)+(f1+ε˜)[RF (yF )−CF (xF )], Eε(·) is the expectation operator
with respect to Ψ(ε), and Π˜L and Π˜C are defined in equations (1) and (2), respectively. To
solve the MNF’s ex-ante decision problem at t = 0, we need to know which expression on
the right-hand side of equation (13) contains the solution.
Consider first the case where z > 0. Using Leibniz’s rule to partially differentiate EU as
defined in equation (13) with respect to z and evaluating the resulting derivative at z → 0+
yields
lim
z→0+
∂EU
∂z
=
∫ f1
f
1
Eε[U ′(Π˜0)(f0 − f1 − ε˜)] dΦ(f1). (14)
Since f0 is set equal to the expected value of e˜2 = f˜1 + ε˜ with respect to φ(f1)ψ(ε), the
right-hand side of equation (14) is simply the negative of the covariance between U ′(Π˜0) and
f˜1 + ε˜ with respect to φ(f1)ψ(ε). It follows from risk aversion that limz→0+ ∂EU/∂z > 0.
Now, consider the case where z < 0. Using Leibniz’s rule to partially differentiate EU as
defined in equation (13) with respect to z and evaluating the resulting derivative at z → 0−
yields
lim
z→0−
∂EU
∂z
=
∫ f1
f
1
Eε[U ′(Π˜0)(f0 − f1 − ε˜)] dΦ(f1). (15)
Inspection of equations (14) and (15) reveals that limz→0+ ∂EU/∂z = limz→0− ∂EU/∂z >
0. Since EU as defined in equation (13) is strictly concave, the MNF must optimally opt
for z > 0. 2
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Appendix B
Let EU be the objective function in program (3). Partially differentiating EU with
respect to z and evaluating the resulting derivative at xH = x∗H , xF = x
∗
F , yH = y
∗
H ,
yF = y∗F , and z = RF (y
∗
F )− CF (x∗F ) yields
∂EU
∂z
=
∫ f0+k/[RF (y∗F )−CF (x∗F )]
f
1
U ′(Π∗C1)Eε(f0 − f1 − ε˜) dΦ(f1)
+
∫ f1
f0+k/[RF (y
∗
F )−CF (x∗F )]
Eε[U ′(Π˜∗L1)](f0 − f1) dΦ(f1)
+{Eε[U(Π˜∗L1)]− U(Π∗C1)}
×φ
[
f0 +
k
RF (y∗F )− CF (x∗F )
]
k
[RF (y∗F )− CF (x∗F )]2
, (16)
where we have used Leibniz’s rule, and
Π˜∗L1 = RH(y
∗
H)− CH (x∗H) + (f0 + ε˜)[RF (y∗F )− CF (x∗F )], (17)
Π∗C1 = RH(y
∗
H)− CH(x∗H) + f0[RF (y∗F )− CF (x∗F )]. (18)
If the right-hand side of equation (16) is negative (positive), it follows from equation (7)
and the second-order conditions for program (3) that z∗ < (>) RF (y∗F )− CF (x∗F ).
Since Eε(ε˜) = 0 and f0 is set equal to the expected value of f˜1 with respect to Φ(f1),
we can write equation (16) as
∂EU
∂z
= {Eε[U ′(Π˜∗L1)]− U ′(Π∗C1)}
∫ f1
f0+k/[RF (y
∗
F )−CF (x∗F )]
(f0 − f1) dΦ(f1)
+{Eε[U(Π˜∗L1)]− U(Π∗C1)}
×φ
[
f0 +
k
RF (y∗F )− CF (x∗F )
]
k
[RF (y∗F )− CF (x∗F )]2
. (19)
Since Eε(ε˜) = 0, it follows from equations (17) and (18), risk aversion, and Jensen’s in-
equality that U(Π∗C1) > Eε[U(Π˜
∗
L1)] and thus the second term on the right-hand side of
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equation (19) is unambiguously negative. Since U(Π) exhibits DARA, we have U ′′′(Π) ≥ 0.
It follows from Eε(ε˜) = 0, equations (17) and (18), and Jensen’s inequality that U ′(Π∗C1) ≤
Eε[U ′(Π˜∗L1)]. Thus, the first term on the right-hand side of equation (19) is also unambigu-
ously negative, implying that z∗ < RF (y∗F )− CF (x∗F ). 2
Appendix C
Substituting equation (6) into equation (4) yields
R′H(y
∗
H) = C
′
H(x
∗
H), (20)
since U ′(Π) > 0. Also, U ′(Π) > 0 implies that equation (5) reduces to
R′F (y
∗
F ) = C
′
F (x
∗
F ). (21)
Substituting equation (7) into equation (6) yields
R′H(y
∗
H) + Θ = f0R
′
F (y
∗
F ), (22)
where Θ is defined by R′F (y
∗
F ) times
Eε[U(Π˜∗C0)− U(Π˜∗L0)]φ(f0 + k/z∗)k/z∗2 −
∫ f1
f0+k/z∗ Eε[U
′(Π˜∗L)ε˜] dΦ(f1)∫ f0+k/z∗
f
1
Eε[U ′(Π˜∗C)] dΦ(f1) +
∫ f1
f0+k/z∗ Eε[U
′(Π˜∗L)] dΦ(f1)
. (23)
Since Eε(ε˜) = 0, it follows from equation (1) and risk aversion that Eε[U ′(Π˜∗L)ε˜] =
Covε[U ′(Π˜∗L), ε˜] < 0. Thus, the second term in the numerator of expression (23) is unam-
biguously positive. The first term in the numerator of expression (23) has the same sign as
Eε[U(Π˜∗C0)− U(Π˜∗L0)].
From Proposition 1, we know that 0 < z∗ < RF (y∗F ) − CF (x∗F ). Let F (Π∗L0) be the
cumulative distribution function of Π˜∗L0. Using the change-of-variable technique (see Hogg
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& Craig, 1989), Π˜∗L0 has support [M + εQ,M + εQ] and F (Π
∗
L0) = Ψ[(Π
∗
L0−M)/Q], where
M = RH(y∗H)−CH(x∗H)+(f0+k/z∗)Q−k and Q = RF (y∗F )−CF (x∗F ). Thus, we can write
Eε[U ′(Π˜∗L0)] =
∫ M+εQ
M+εQ
U ′(X) dF (X). (24)
Likewise, let G(Π∗C0) be the cumulative distribution function of Π˜
∗
C0. Using the change-
of-variable technique, Π˜∗C0 has support [M + ε(Q − z∗),M + ε(Q − z∗)] and G(Π∗C0) =
F [Π∗C0 + (Π
∗
C0 −M)z∗/(Q− z∗)]. Thus, we can write
Eε[U ′(Π˜∗C0)] =
∫ M+(Q−z∗)
M+(Q−z∗)
U ′(X) dG(X). (25)
Subtracting equation (25) by equation (24) yields
Eε[U(Π˜∗C0)− U(Π˜∗L0)] =
∫ M+Q
M+Q
U ′(X) d[G(X)− F (X)], (26)
which follows from the fact that dG(X) = 0 for all X ∈ [M + εQ,M + ε(Q− z∗)]⋃ [M +
ε(Q− z∗),M + εQ].
Consider the function, T (X) =
∫X
M+εQ[F (Y )−G(Y )] dY , for all X ∈ [M+εQ,M+εQ].
Then, we can write
T (X) =

∫X
M+εQ F (Y ) dY
if M + εQ ≤ X < M + ε(Q− z∗),
∫X
M+εQ F (Y ) dY −
∫X
M+ε(Q−z∗)G(Y ) dY
if M + ε(Q− z∗) ≤ X ≤M + ε(Q− z∗),
∫X
M+εQ F (Y ) dY −
∫M+ε(Q−z∗)
M+ε(Q−z∗) G(Y ) dY −
∫X
M+ε(Q−z∗) dY
if M + ε(Q− z∗) < X ≤M + εQ,
which follows from the fact that dG(X) = 0 for all X ∈ [M + εQ,M + ε(Q − z∗)]⋃[M +
ε(Q− z∗),M + εQ]. Differentiating T (X) with respect to X and using Leibniz’s rule yields
T ′(X) =

F (X) if M + εQ ≤ X < M + ε(Q− z∗),
F (X)−G(X) if M + ε(Q− z∗) ≤ X ≤M + (Q∗ −H∗),
Φ(X)− 1 if M + ε(Q− z∗) < X ≤M + εQ.
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It follows fromG(X) = F [X+(X−M)z∗/(Q−z∗)] that F (X)−G(X) > (<) 0 ifX < (>)M .
Hence, T (X) is strictly increasing for all X ∈ (M + εQ,M) and strictly decreasing for all
X ∈ (M,M + εQ). Note that
T (M + εQ) =
∫ M+εQ
M+εQ
F (Y ) dY −
∫ M+ε(Q−z∗)
M+ε(Q−z∗)
G(Y ) dY −
∫ M+εQ
M+ε(Q−z∗)
dY
=M + εQ−
∫ M+εQ
M+εQ
Y dF (Y )− [M + ε(Q− z∗)]
+
∫ M+ε(Q−z∗)
M+ε(Q−z∗)
Y dG(Y )−
∫ M+εQ
M+ε(Q−z∗)
dY
= 0,
where the second equality follows from integration by parts and the fact that F (M +εQ) =
G[M + ε(Q − z∗)] = 0 and F (M + εQ) = G[M + ε(Q − z∗)] = 1. Since T (M + εQ) =
T (M + εQ) = 0 and T (X) is first increasing and then decreasing in X , it must be true
that T (X) > 0 for all X ∈ (M + εQ,M + εQ). In other words, F (X) is a mean preserving
spread of G(X) in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). According to Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1971), the right-hand side of equation (26) is unambiguously positive given risk
aversion and thus Θ > 0.
Suppose that x∗H ≥ x0H . Equations (10) and (20) imply that y∗H ≤ y0H . It then follows
from Θ > 0 and equations (12) and (22) that y∗F < y
0
F . Equations (11) and (21) thus imply
that x∗F > x
0
F . Since y
∗
H ≤ y0H , y∗F < y0F , and x∗F > x0F , it must be true that x∗H < x0H ,
a contradiction. Likewise, suppose that x∗F ≤ x0F . Equations (11) and (21) imply that
y∗F ≥ y0F . It then follows from Θ > 0 and equations (12) and (22) that y∗H > y0H . Equations
(10) and (20) thus imply that x∗H < x
0
H . Since y
∗
H > y
0
H , y
∗
F ≥ y0F , and x∗H < x0H , it must
be true that x∗F > x
0
F , a contradiction. Hence, we conclude that x
∗
H < x
0
H and x
∗
F > x
0
F
and from equations (10), (11), (20), and (21) that y∗H > y
0
H and y
∗
F < y
0
F . 2
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